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Note
Begging to Defer: OSHA and the Problem of
Interpretive Authority
Government agencies' today crowd all facets of American
life.2 They possess expertise needed for regulating complex
matters such as workplace health and safety.3 Agencies are
not, however, computer-like data processors; they make impor4
tant policy decisions in choosing among regulatory options.
1. The federal government began using agencies to regulate the economy
in the nineteenth century. See D. NELKIN & M. BROwN, WORKERS AT RISK:
VOICES FROM THE WORKPLACE 125 (1984). Agency regulation, however,
sprawls well beyond the economic sphere. One commentator suggests that
agencies serve a variety of "functions and malfunctions." See Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: FourLessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271,
272-74 (1986) (noting regulation may police discriminatory practices, redistribute wealth, promote economic efficiency, shape public preferences, or "may reflect little or nothing more than interest-group pressures and thus serve no
public purpose"); see also DeLong, New Wine ForA New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399, 401-403 (1986) (taxonomizing
federal agencies on the basis of their policy functions). Most regulatory agencies "are located within a cabinet department and are subject to the control of
administrative superiors who are political appointees." F. HEFFRON & N.
MCFEELEY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY PROCESS 130 (1983).

2. Compare Sjoberg, Vaughan & Williams, Bureaucracy as a Moral Issue,
20 J. APP. BEH. SCI. 441, 441 (1984) (stating that "[t]he advance of bureaucracy
...has accompanied a rise in the standard of living and quality of life for significant segments of the world's people .... [but] has generated the major
moral problems of our time") with Milward & Rainey, Don't Blame the Bureaucracy!,3 J. PUB. POL'Y 149, 164 (1983) (stating that "[a]ll advanced modern
societies have large public sectors, and in fact the United States ranks about
eight among the major industrialized democracies in percentage of gross domestic product accounted for by the public sector") and Newitt, In Search of
the Bloated Bureaucracy,8 AM. DEMOG. 26 (March 1986) (noting that between
1954 and 1986, public employment grew by just 14% in the United States while
total jobs increased 74%).
3. See, e.g., In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulatory Litig., 653 F.2d
514, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (commenting that judicial respect for
agency expertise "is particularly appropriate when a complex regulatory statute emerges from a process of difficult legislative gestation"), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 822 (1981).
4. See Pierce, The Role of Constitutionaland PoliticalTheory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1985). According to Pierce, agencies
make three types of sweeping decisions in formulating regulations: "(1) how
to maximize aggregate social welfare; (2) how to distribute society's wealth
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Courts limit agency discretion by requiring agencies to act
within the scope of their authority. 5 Because the courts themselves are isolated from the electorate, however, their review of
6
agency decisions is deferential.
The tension between controlling agencies and deferring to
them creates a dilemma for courts interpreting regulations
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
("OSHA"). 7 Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of
Labor to set standards for workplace health and safety,8 and
created the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC") to adjudicate disputes arising from violations
of those standards. 9 When the Secretary and OSHRC render
conflicting interpretations of an OSHA regulation, the circuits
are divided over which interpretation to follow. 10 This Note
proposes a resolution to the circuit split based on a policy analysis of judicial review of agency decisions. Part I explains
agency rulemaking procedure, examines judicial standards of
review of agency interpretations, and introduces the controversy over OSHA interpretations. Part II analyzes this controversy in light of legislative intent, precedent, and policy. The
Note concludes that courts should defer to the Secretary's interpretations rather than OSHRC's, and formulates a standard
of review designed to delineate the proper scope of judicial and
agency authority.
I.

THE PROCEDURAL AND PRECEDENTIAL CONTEXT
OF INTERPRETIVE REVIEW

A. AGENCY RULEMAKING
1.

Rulemaking in General
Agencies

make

law

through

congressional

grants

of

among competing groups and regions; and (3) how to resolve the inevitable
conflicts between the goals of wealth maximization and equitable distribution
of wealth." Id. at 472; see also Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA.
L. REV. 363, 364-67 (1986) (analyzing models of F .;iistrative decisionmaking
process).
5. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (describing judicial methods of reviewing agency actions).
6. See infra notes 63-80 and accompanying text (describing judicial standards for review of agency rule interpretations).

7.
8.
9.
10.

29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
Id § 651.
Id § 659(c).
See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
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power 11 by promulgating rules and enforcing them, and by adjudicating disputes. 12 In exercising those powers, agencies are
bound by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 13 which
prescribes several forms of rulemaking. To make a rule under
the "formal rulemaking" procedure, an agency must conduct a
public hearing, evaluate evidence, and make findings on the
record.' 4 An agency must use this formal rulemaking process,
however, only if the statute empowering the agency requires
it°15

Some agencies need follow only the APA's "informal
rulemaking" formula. Under this procedure, the agency must
give public notice of the proposed rulemaking, solicit participation of interested persons, and incorporate in the final rule a
concise statement of its basis and purpose.' 6 The multiple steps
11. In delegating power to agencies, Congress employs vague statutory
language, leaving room for agencies to exercise discretion and develop policy.
See D. RILEY, CONTROLLING THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 83 (1987) (noting
that "structural questions [decided by agencies have] significant policy implications"); Pierce, supra note 4, at 473 (noting statutory language can establish
more or less precise policy standards for agency to follow).
12. See F. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4, at 7 (1976) (noting "the
outstanding characteristic of the administrative agency is its possession of legislative and judicial powers").
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982).
14. See id& § 556(b) (governing rulemaking hearings); § 557 (governing determination of tentative and final decisions regarding proposed rules and requiring record of factfinding and reasons for adopting or rejecting proposed
rules); see also F. HEFFRON & N. MCFEELEY, supra note 1, at 235-37 (stating
that §§ 556 and 557 require "that an agency hold a trial-type hearing on the
proposed rule, follow all the procedural requirements for such a hearing ....
and base the final rule on 'substantial evidence in the record' of the hearing").
15. See F. HEFFRON & N. McFEELEY, supra note 1, at 236.
16. Section 553 states that:
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either
personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include - (1) a statement of the time,
place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to
the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved. Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply - (A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). The section also specifies that:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through subAfter consideration
mission of written data, views, or arguments ....
of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the
rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
Id § 553(c).
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required to promulgate a regulation under either the formal or
the informal procedure guarantee notice to members of the
public, opportunity for outsiders to participate, and agency
accountability.
The APA also provides for the adjudication of disputes
arising from violations of agency rules or matters within the jurisdiction granted agencies by statute.'1 Agencies therefore can
establish law either through promulgation of general rules by
formal or informal process1 8 or on a case-by-case basis through
adjudication. 19
Not all agency rules have legal effect, however. 20 Courts
distinguish between "legislative" and "interpretive" rules. Legislative rules "prescribe, modify, or abolish duties, rights or exemptions." 21 Interpretive rules clarify a rule or agency policy
for the public, agency staff, and political leaders, but do not
22
have legal effect.
17. See id. § 554. Although the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication sometimes becomes foggy, "'adjudication' resembles what a court
does in deciding a case," while "'rulemaking' resembles what a legislature
does in enacting a statute." 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:2,
at 7 (1979).
18. Once rules are made, agencies can use informal means to seek compliance, including threats of prosecution, publicity, or nonrenewal of a license.
See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV.L. REV. 921, 923-24 (1965); see also F. HEFFRON & N. MCFEELEY, supra note 1, at 201 (enumerating possible agency
tactics).
19. See Note, AdministrativeAdjudication-A New Legal Standardfor its
Use-Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 58 WASH. L. REV. 633, 633 n.1 (1983) (noting that
"[a]gencies use rulemaking and adjudication to formulate legislative-type
rules, and to secure compliance with existing rules and regulations").
20. Something has legal effect if it derives from proper authority and
prescribes a penalty or course of conduct, confers a right, privilege, authority,
or immunity, or imposes an obligation. Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking
and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L. J. 381, 383 n.13 (quoting 1 C.F.R. § 1.1
(1984)).
21. Id. at 383. Legislative rules may have the force of law. See F. HEFFRON & N. MCFEELEY, supra note 1, at 235 (presenting three criteria under
which legislative rule has force of law).
22. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (stating that "a
court is not required to give effect to an interpretive regulation"); Seneca Oil
v. Department of Energy, 712 F.2d 1384, 1396 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983)
(noting that interpretive rulings are not binding on courts, while legislative
regulations have force of law); see also British Caledonian Airways v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 584 F.2d 982, 992 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that interpretive order is "more subject to invalidation than a legislative rule of the agency
would be"); 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 17, at 57 (distinguishing "agency action
which carries out delegated power" from "agency action which is not based on
delegated power," and noting this "is the essence of the difference between
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OSHA Rulemaking

The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 197023 authorizes the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory health and safety
standards for the workplace. 24 The Secretary promulgates regulations, 25 inspects job sites, 26 identifies employers who violate
the regulations, 27 and notifies such employers of proposed penalties. 28 The Act creates a separate body, the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission, to adjudicate disputes
that arise when employers contest the Secretary's citations or
29
penalties.
The original occupational safety and health bill delivered
to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 196930
gave the Secretary power to set nationwide occupational safety
and health standards, 31 to enforce the standards by conducting
inspections and investigations, 32 and to hold hearings for violations. 33 As reported by the committee, the bill vested in the
Secretary all three regulatory powers of rulemaking, enforcelegislative rules and interpretative rules"); Asimow, supra note 20, at 394-401
(describing judicial tests for determining whether rule is legislative or
interpretive).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982). OSHA regulations cover five million employment establishments. See Mangum, Murder in the Workplace: Criminal
Prosecutionv. Regulatory Enforcement, 39 LABOR L. J. 220, 228 (1988).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
25. Id. § 651(b)(3).
26. Id. § 657.
27. Id, § 659(a).
28. Id. The Secretary may compromise or settle the amount of penalty
with the employer. See Dale M. Madden Constr. v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278, 280
(9th Cir. 1974).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982). OSHRC refers the dispute to an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), 29 U.S.C. § 661(d), who conducts hearings in which
employers, employees, and the Secretary potentially may participate. 29
U.S.C. § 665. The ALJ's conclusion then becomes OSHRC's final order unless
a commissioner requests review. 29 U.S.C. § 661(j). OSHRC may affirm, modify, or vacate a citation or proposed penalty on the basis of findings of fact. 29
U.S.C. § 659(c). Both employers and the Secretary have the right of appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 660(b).
30. Senator Williams introduced S. 2193, a bill "[t]o authorize the Secretary of Labor to set standards to assure safe and healthful working conditions
for working men and women." S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., (1969).
All the OSHA legislative history materials cited in notes 30-55 are reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB.
WELFARE, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 1 (1971)
HISTORY].

31.
32.
33.

Id. § 3.
Id. § 5.
Id. § 6.

[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
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ment, and adjudication. 34 The committee voted down a proposal to create a rulemaking board independent of the Secretary.
It expressly rejected arguments that such a board would have
greater rulemaking expertise than the Secretary and would
represent a needed separation of powers between rulemaking
and enforcement, 35 although some members of the committee
disapproved of the reported bill 36 . The committee also rejected

a compromise amendment, proposed by Senator Javits, that
would have vested policymaking authority in the Secretary but
vested adjudicatory power in a separate panel.3 7 Under the Javits Amendment, later offered by the senator as an amendment
on the floor, 38 this panel primarily would make "findings as to
the facts." 39 The panel's rulemaking authority would extend
only to making "such rules as are necessary for the orderly
34.

S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, repi rinted in 1970 U.S.

CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS 5177, 5784-85.

35. 1d. With regard to expertise, the committee conceded that "professional and technical expertise must be involved in the development and promulgation of a standard," but concluded that "such expertise would be fully
available to the Secretary." Id. Moreover, the committee concluded that a
sound program
will result if responsibility for this formation of rules is assigned to
the same administrator who is also responsible for their enforcement
and for seeing that they are workable and effective in their day-to-day
application, thus permitting cohesive administration of a total program. In the committee's view, the question of separation of power is
not so much one of whether the Secretary should be separated from
the power to set standards, but whether he should be separated from
the power to administer an integral program, and from the power of
Congress and the public to hold him accountable for the overall implementation of that program.
Id.
36. Senator Javits noted, for example, that controversy over the Secretary's powers had become "the key issue .. . which has polarized labor and
management." Id. at 54 (separate statement of Sen. Javits).
37. See id. at 55-56 (separate statement of Sen. Javits) (arguing that provision for three-person "independent panel" would speed up enforcement and
accord more closely "with traditional notions of due process than would hearing and determination by the Secretary," through which the Secretary would
be "essentially acting as prosecutor and judge"). The committee rejected the
amendment by a 10-7 vote. Id. 16 at.
38. S.AMEND. No. 1061, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 36, 531-32
(1970).
39. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 392 (statement of Sen. Javits).
Senator Javits reiterated the justifications for taking adjudication away from
the Secretary: increased procedural expediency and "traditional notions of
due process." Id Expressing confidence in the ability of the Secretary to
safeguard due process, he concluded nonetheless that "[t]he important thing is
to inspire confidence in the community we expect to obey this law." Id. at 469.
See also id, at 473 (statement of Sen. Holland) (emphasizing need to foster
"public confidence and acceptance").
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'40

transaction of its proceedings.
Advocates of the original committee bill countered on the
floor, arguing that such a division of power was unnecessary
and counterproductive. Through enforcement, they contended,
the Secretary would develop more expertise and would make
better rules.4 1 Creating more agency divisions would merely
add to the nation's bureaucratic web without providing any
greater due process than the APA.4 Further, allowing the Secretary to promulgate rules would let workers more easily grasp
how standards were being set.43 Moreover, by avoiding "unnecessary legal steps," the committee bill sought to prevent litig'44
ious delay that could threaten "the life of the worker.
Senator Dominick also offered a substitute bill 45 that
would have divided responsibility three ways, creating an Occupational Safety and Health Board to promulgate rules, authorizing the Secretary of Labor to enforce them, and empaneling
an Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Commission to adjudicate disputes. 46 Advocates of this substitute criticized the
40.
41.

S. AMEND. No. 1061, supra note 38 § 11(g).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 428-30 (statement of Sen.

Williams).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 432 (arguing that workers are "entitled to know").
44. Id. at 433.
45. S. 4404, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 30, at 73-140.
46. Id. Proponents of this substitute voiced their opposition to allowing
the Secretary to exercise all three regulatory powers. Senator Saxbe, for example, stated that:
[Alt the present time the bill requires that the Secretary of Labor...
set safety standards. These standards, once set, will be enforced by
whom? The Secretary of Labor. If a violation is found in a plant and
a complaint is made, to whom do they go? The Secretary of Labor.
And if the plant needs to be closed, there is a provision for a court
procedure, but there is also a relief valve providing that the Secretary
of Labor can close the plant in an emergency.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 320 (statement of Sen. Saxbe). See
also id. at 335-36 (statement of Sen. Saxbe) (arguing that to give the Secretary
so much power would be "unseemly"); id at 420 (stating that "concentration
of power gives rise to a great potential for abuse"); id. at 472 (arguing that dividing power would prevent the Secretary from running an inquisitional "star
chamber"). Senator Tower expressed concern that with "no checks and safeguards placed on the power of the Secretary, an "enormous amount of power
...could easily be abused, culminating in a breakdown of existing Government neutrality in labor-management relations." Id. at 448 (statement of Sen.
Tower). Senator Dominick explained:
One of the things I am trying to avoid is to try to put everything in
one heap and say that because it is in one heap, it is obviously going to
be a nice one, filled with sweet perfume, which will do great things
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committee bill's "simplistic approach of placing all functions in
'47
the Secretary of Labor.
The Senate rejected the Dominick substitute bill,48 and focused on the Javits compromise amendment. 49 The Senate
eventually passed the bill in that form. 50
In the House, the Committee on Education and Labor reported a companion bill to the version introduced in the Senate.51 This committee also rejected any splitting of the
Secretary's power. 52 On the House floor, opponents of the bill
voiced the same concerns as Senate opponents. 5 3 The House refor the rest of the country. We can do it far better in setting up an
independent board.
Id. at 486 (statement of Sen. Dominick). Critics of the Secretary advanced an
amendment to the committee bill, proposing a separate board for rulemaking.
S. AMEND. No. 1053, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. RES. 36,530 (1970). Supporters of the amendment argued that it would foster a "balanced governmental structure," and would break up an "undesirable monopoly of functions."
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 363 (statement of Sen. Dominick).
The Senate later tabled the amendment. Id at 449. The Appeals Commission's "only function would be to conduct hearings on alleged violations discovered by the Secretary." Id. at 298 (statement of Senator Saxbe).
47. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 298 (statement of Sen. Saxbe)
(comparing proposed system to "having the Chief of Police, in addition to...
conducting inspections, also write the criminal laws and then act as judge and

jury").
Throughout debate, members of both houses confronted and contested the
issue of the Secretary's policymaking power. In the Senate, the issue was the
"nut in the coconut." Id. at 464 (statement of Sen. Javits).
The issue of rulemaking power also remained central throughout the
House's debate. See, e.g., id. at 979-90 (statement of Rep. Smith) (discussing
proposal to create separate Occupational Safety and Health Board with
rulemaking authority).
48. Id. at 461.
49. Id, at 478 (noting that Senate passed Javits amendment by vote of 4338).
50. Id. at 528 (by vote of 83-3).
51. H.R. 16785, 91st. Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1970).
52. See HOUSE COMM. ON ED. AND LABOR, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS. (1970), REPORT ON THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 18, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 831, 848. The committee
considered and unequivocally rejected any provision for a National
Occupational Safety and Health Board to promulgate standards ....
The Committee agrees that professional and technical information
must precede the decision to establish a standard, but experts would
be used in an advisory capacity with decision-making as part of the
Secretary's authority. In this way, the focal point of responsibility is
more easily identified.
Id.
53. See, e.g., id. at 53-54 (minority views of Reps. Scherle, Ashbrook, Eshleman, Collins, Landgrebe, and Ruth) (characterizing lack of power separation
as "specific defect" in house bill); see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30,
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ceived the bill passed by the Senate and amended it54to include a
policymaking board independent of the Secretary.
The Senate version ultimately passed both the House and
Senate, and became the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970.55 The final version of the Act vested policymaking and
of the Secretary, while
enforcement authority in the hands 56
vesting adjudicatory power in OSHRC.
B.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS

1. Generally
Judicial review of agencies takes several forms. Courts can
invoke constitutional delegation doctrine, reverse agency actions that do not conform to procedural requirements, and scrutinize agency rule interpretations.
Courts occasionally invoke "delegation doctrine" to strike
down agency-creating legislation.5 7 According to this doctrine,
Congress unconstitutionally surrenders its article I lawmaking
powers when it gives an agency too much discretion through an
excessively vague statutory standard for agency action. 58
at 1050 (statement of Rep. Michel) (objecting to lack of power separation "on

the grounds that it would place unlimited power in the hands of the Secretary
of Labor"); id. at 1062 (statement of Rep. Sikes) (stating that "[t]he enormous
amount of power given to the Secretary of Labor by the Commttee bill could
easily be abused").
54. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 1146.
55. Id. at 1225.
56. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
57. Compare Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 675 (1989) (upholding congressional delegation of authority to an independent sentencing commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines) with Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 734 (1986) (striking portions of Gramm-Rudman Act on separation of powers grounds because it vested too much authority in Comptroller General).
Because of the doctrine's ambiguity, courts today rarely invoke it. See, e.g.,
Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine,36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (arguing that "courts are justified in refusing to invoke this long somnolent doctrine
in any but the most unusual and infrequent circumstances).
58. Delegation doctrine entwines courts in the difficult line-drawing problem of deciding how vague is too vague. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst.
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543, 545 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that OSHA itself is unconstitutional, because Congress delegated legislative
authority through vague grant of power); see also Humphrey v. Baker, 848
F.2d 211, 216 n.7 (D.C. Cir.) (noting static condition of doctrine: "no recent
doctrinal developments have undermined the Supreme Court's treatment of
delegation questions, which has remained essentially unchanged since the constitutional triumph of the New Deal"), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 491 (1988);
Schoenbrod, The DelegationDoctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1249-74 (1985) (proposing new judicial test for delegation
doctrine problems).
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Courts also may reverse agency actions that do not conform to statutory procedural requirements imposed by Congress.59 Courts may determine that an agency made a finding
reasons
of fact based on inadequate evidence,60 gave inadequate
62
for a decision, 61 or committed a procedural error.
Finally, courts can hold that an agency wrongly interpreted
a statute or regulation. 6 3 Unlike a reversal on procedural
grounds, this type of reversal prevents an agency from simply
'64
fixing the defect and "tak[ing] the same action a second time.
The judicial standard of review depends on whether the agency
is interpreting its enabling statute or its own regulations, 65 and
on whether several organs of the same agency offer conflicting
66
interpretations.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 6 7 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve confusion over
the proper scope of judicial review of agency interpretation of
enabling statutes.68 Chevron involved an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) interpretation of the Clean Air Act,
which set stringent requirements for manufacturers seeking to
install new stationarysources of air pollutants or to modify existing sources. 69 The EPA announced a "plantwide definition"
59. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 41314 (1971). When an agency rule is challenged as arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion, courts may review the record to determine whether "substantial evidence" justifies the rule. See id. at 413-18. Courts may not, however, force agencies to employ more procedure than the APA requires. See
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978).
60.

See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND

PROcEss § 7.3, at 357-69 (1985).
61. See id. § 7.5, at 377-78.
62. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Committee, 622 F.2d 1160, 1166-68 (3d Cir. 1980) (reversing agency decision because agency did not follow circuit precedent as to definition of term
willfulness).
63. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, supra note 60, § 7.8.1, at
410-13.
64. Id. § 7.8.1, at 410.
65. See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
67. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
68. Before Chevron, courts deferred to agency interpretations in varying
degrees. Some courts independently analyzed agency interpretations, while
other courts upheld agency interpretations so long as they were reasonable.
See Note, A Frameworkfor JudicialReview of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469, 471 & n.18.
69. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
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of the term stationarysources, 70 which the Court upheld after
articulating an exceedingly deferential two-part test of agency
interpretations. 71 When faced with an agency's construction of
its enabling statute, a court first must ask "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 72 If Congress clearly intended a certain meaning for a statutory provi73
sion, both agencies and courts must accept that meaning.
When congressional intent is ambiguous, however, "the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. '74 The Chevron test
marked a move toward greater judicial deference to agency in75
terpretations of enabling statutes.
Courts accord even greater deference, however, to an
70. Id. at 840-41. Under the EPA's definition of stationarysource, a company could install or modify a piece of equipment at a given plant without
meeting permit requirements as long as the alteration did not increase the
plant's total emissions. Id. at 853-59.
71. Id. at 866. The court of appeals had held the EPA's interpretations
void as "'inappropriate' in programs enacted to improve air quality." Id. at
841-42 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718,
726 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
72. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
73. Id at 842-43.
74. Id at 843. The Court underscored the degree of deference this standard provides by explaining that lower courts "need not conclude that the
agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted. . ., or
even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had
arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 843 n.11.
75. See Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 300, 308-09 (1986) (describing "broader message" of Chevron); Note, supra
note 68, at 495 (noting Court presented "a framework... that provides meaningful judicial review while prohibiting judicial infringement on an agency's
legitimate authority"); see, e.g., National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA, 866
F.2d 717, 733 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that "only where congressional intent is
pellucid are we entitled to reject reasonable administrative construction of a
statute"); Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that where
Congress has not directly resolved issue, "a court accepts the construction of a
statute posited by the agency Congress has charged to administer it"); Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that
"agency's interpretation of the applicable statute is entitled to substantial deference"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); Lugo v. Schweiker, 776 F.2d 1143,
1148 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that deference to Secretary's reasonable interpretation is "basic principle of administrative law and statutory construction");
Sundberg v. Mansour, 627 F. Supp. 616, 620 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (stating that
court's task is merely to determine whether agency's interpretation is "reasonable" and "consistent with the statutory purpose"). But cf Dugan v. Ramsay,
727 F.2d 192, 196 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding "the agency interpretation here at issue is so totally unreasonable as to be without support in the authorizing
statute").
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agency's interpretation of its own regulations. 76 In Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,7 7 the Supreme Court accepted an
agency's construction of a wartime price regulation. 78 The
Bowles Court adopted a deferential standard of review for
agency regulatory interpretations, stating that "the ultimate
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation." 79 Following this standard, lower courts
defer to agency interpretations of regulations.8 0
76. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (stating that "[w]hen the
construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue,
deference is even more clearly in order"); see also Texas Mun. Power Agency
v. Administrator, EPA, 836 F.2d 1482, 1488 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that agency's
interpretations of its regulations are entitled to great deference); National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 746 F.2d 1492, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(same); Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs., 689 F.2d 724, 729 (7th
Cir. 1982) (same); Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel, 610 F. Supp. 1489, 1496
(D.D.C. 1985) (same), cert denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987); Marathon Oil Co. v.
United States, 604 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Alaska 1985) (same).
77. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
78. The Administrator of the Office of Price Administration had issued
regulations under The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Id. at 411. The
Court accepted the Administrator's interpretation because it was consistent
with the language of the statute. Id. at 418.
79. Id at 414. On several occasions, the Court has reaffirmed the Bowles
standard of review for agency interpretations of regulations. See, e.g., Mullins
Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 108 S. Ct.
427, 440 (1987); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986); Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864,
872 (1977); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393
U.S. 268, 276 (1969).
80. See, e.g., Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1138 (2d Cir.
1988) (deferring to agency "regarding interpretation of regulations it participated in formulating"); Wilder v. Prokop, 846 F.2d 613, 619 (10th Cir. 1988) (relying on agency interpretations of regulations as "controlling law"); NationalSouthwire Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 835, 838 (6th Cir.) (giving agency
interpretations "special deference"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 390 (1988); California Dep't of Educ. v. Bennett, 833 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1987) (giving agency
interpretations "substantial deference"); New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346, 349
(2d Cir. 1987) (same) (citing Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986)); National
Trust for Historic Preservation v. Dole, 828 F.2d 776, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (giving agency interpretations "great deference"); Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1323 (3d Cir.
1987) (stating that court must defer unless an agency's interpretation is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent); Mast Indus. v. United States, 822 F.2d 1069, 1073
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (affording agency interpretations "substantial weight");
Hunter v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 803 F.2d 800,
802 (4th Cir. 1986) (reciting Bowles standard); United States v. Saade, 800 F.2d
269, 271 (1st Cir. 1986) (according "considerable weight"); Parker v. Bowen,
788 F.2d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1986) (agency interpretations holding that agency
interpretation is "entitled to deference"); Kickapoo Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil
Corp., 779 F.2d 61, 67 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (reciting Bowles standard);
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Sometimes separate organs of the same agency develop
Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1984) (giving agency interpretations "significant weight" and "great deference") (quoting Builders Steel Co. v.
Marshall, 575 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1978) and Murphy Oil Corp. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 589 F.2d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1054 (1985); PPG Indus. v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 633 (5th Cir. 1981) (giving agency interpretations "controlling weight"); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 271 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that "court should consider administrative interpretation"). But cf. United
States v. Eastern Air Lines, 792 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that
court "should not mechanically adopt interpretation that exceeds the bounds
of reasonableness"); Bahramizadeh v. INS, 717 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (7th Cir.
1983) (per curiam) (rejecting agency interpretation under "great deference"
standard because interpretation was "not consistent with the express wording
of the regulation"); Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 363
n.42 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that where interpretation is "contradicted by strong
evidence, it need not be followed"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Stewards
Found. v. United States, 654 F.2d 28, 33 n.10 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (rejecting agency
interpretation because agency failed to provide "sufficient, consistent application" of interpretation); Cardenas v. Walters, 633 F. Supp. 776, 777-78 (W.D.
Pa. 1985) (stating that agency "interpretation cannot be upheld if it flies in the
face of the regulation's intent").
Some courts adjust the level of deference they give agency interpretations
according to the degree of technical expertise the subject matter of the regulation requires. See, e.g., Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (assuming without deciding that less deference is due an agency interpretation
involving a matter beyond the agency's special expertise), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1556 (1989); Pacific Coast Medical Enter. v. Harris, 633 F.2d 123, 131 (9th
Cir. 1980) (noting that "agency's expertise make[s] it particularly suited to interpret the language"); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St.
Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 358 n.15 (8th Cir.) (stating that agency interpretations are
entitled to especially great deference" where . . . [the regulations] are highly
technical"), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Grossman v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp.
570, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that "agency's interpretation is not entitled to
great deference . . . if it rests upon general common-law principles and not
upon expertise within the agency's particular field"); Roberts Constr. Co. v.
Small Business Admin., 657 F. Supp. 418, 422 (D. Colo. 1987) (stating that "deference is especially appropriate if agency expertise or technical knowledge is
involved"); Garner v. Office of Personnel Management, 633 F. Supp. 995, 999
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (noting degree of deference "is directly proportional to the
complexity of the statutes and regulations involved").
A special situation exists when an agency presents a particular construction of a regulation for the first time during litigation. The potential for bias
against the opposing party then weighs against deferring to the agency construction. In addition, offering a new interpretation at the litigation stage may
deprive a party of the notice necessary to comply with the regulation. Moreover, the policy of settling expectations that buttresses the deference principle,
see infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text, is not present when an agency
first offers a construction at the litigation stage. Courts therefore generally refuse to accord Bowles deference to the agency in this situation. See, e.g., Alaniz
v. Office of Personnel Management, 728 F.2d 1460, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that "no deference is due to an agency 'interpretation' fashioned for the
purposes of litigation"); Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.,
567 F.2d 1174, 1177 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting agency's interpretation first of-
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conflicting interpretations of a regulation, however.8 1 Such a
conflict creates problems even for courts willing to defer to the
82
the
agency. In Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director,
Supreme Court rejected the Benefits Review Board's (BRB) interpretation of a provision of the Longshore and Workers'
Compensation Act in favor of the Secretary of Labor's interpretation.8 3 The Court ruled that the BRB deserved no interpretive deference because it is merely an adjudicatory body with
8 4
no policymaking authority.
fered as "litigating position"); Massy v. United States, 214 F.2d 935, 940 (8th
Cir. 1954) (refusing to accord deference to agency interpretation not offered
until regulation ceased to be in effect, not published in Federal Register, and
not issued until beginning of trial); Morabito v. Blum, 528 F. Supp. 252, 270
n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that "where an agency files an amicus curiae
brief setting forth its opinion as to the proper reading of one of its regulations,
such an expression of opinion is not an 'interpretation' within the meaning of
the [deference] rules"). But cf.Kickapoo Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., 779 F.2d
61, 67 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing that Bowles logic does not apply, but accepting agency interpretation advanced in amicus brief as "persuasive in its own right").
81. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (documenting conflicting
judicial approaches to interpretations under OSHA). Benefits Review Board
(BRB) cases pose a similar problem. Under both the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982), and the Black Lung
Benefits provision, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, of the Mine Safety and Health Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 801-962, the Secretary of Labor sets policy regulations, while the
BRB adjudicates disputes. 30 U.S.C. §§ 811(a), 921(b), 932(a) (incorporating by
reference 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)), 939(a). See Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 766 F.2d 128, 130 (3d Cir. 1985)
(noting that "It]he BRB ... is merely an adjudicatory tribunal, and Congress
has conferred upon it no authority to make rules or formulate policy").
82. 449 U.S. 268 (1980).
83. 1& at 274.
84. Id at 278 n.18 (noting that BRB "is not a policymaking agency; its interpretation ...thus is not entitled to any special deference from the courts").
Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's distinction between
rulemaking and adjudicatory authority in the context of BRB cases, deferring
to the Secretary of Labor rather than to the BRB. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v.
Patterson, 846 F.2d 715, 723 (11th Cir. 1988) (according BRB no "special deference"); Sanders v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 841 F.2d 1085, 1087
(11th Cir. 1988) (same); William Bros. v. Pate, 833 F.2d 261, 264 (11th Cir. 1987)
(same); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Hill, 831 F.2d
635, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (stating that BRB is "entitled to no deference" because it is "quasi-judicial body empowered to resolve legal issues, but
not to engage in... rulemaking"); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1323 (3d Cir. 1987) (deferring to "the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, not to the BRB, for
the Director is the maker of policy"); Old Ben Coal Co. v. Luker, 826 F.2d 688,
696 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing "independent adjudicatory capacities"
from "rulemaking authority"); Saginaw Mining Co. v. Mazzulli, 818 F.2d 1278,
1283 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that "the Director's statutory interpretation is the
one entitled to judicial deference, since he is the one charged with administra-
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Judicial Review of OSHA Interpretations

Congress divided administrative power between the Secretary and OSHRC under OSHA8 5 as it divided power between
the Secretary of Labor and the BRB in the Potomac case. 86 After the Secretary promulgates a regulation and cites a violator,
OSHRC adjudicates the case.8 7 If OSHRC's interpretation differs from that of the Secretary, courts cannot simply defer to
the agency as the Supreme Court directed in Bowles 88 and
Chevron.8 9 Courts instead must decide whether to give effect to
the Secretary's or to OSHRC's interpretation, or to take some
third path. 90 The circuits disagree over which interpretation to
follow. Some circuits defer to the Secretary, 91 others follow
tion"); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (noting interpretive discretion lies with policymaker not adjudicator);
Peabody Coal Co. v. Blankenship, 773 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1985) (deferring
to Director's interpretations unless plainly erroneous); Bethlehem Mines
Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 766 F.2d 128,
130 (3d Cir. 1985) (deferring to Director as delegate of Secretary of Labor,
rather than to BRB); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, 765 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that "because the [BRB] does not make policy, its interpretations... are not entitled
to any special deference"); Strachan Shipping Co. v. Nash, 751 F.2d 1460, 1462
n.2 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Black, 717 F.2d 1280, 1288
(9th Cir. 1983) (same), cerL denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984). But see Long v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 767 F.2d 1578, 1580 (9th Cir.
1985) (deferring to BRB interpretation "'where that interpretation is reasonable and reflects the policy underlying the statute' ") (quoting National Steel
& Shipbuilding Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 606 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1979)).
85. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
87. See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
88. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945);
supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing Bowles).
89. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 866 (1984); supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (discussing

Chevron).
90. See Brock v. L.R. Willson & Sons, 773 F.2d 1377, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(noting agency's interpretation of its own regulations generally gets "controlling weight," but "[t]his principle is not easily adapted to OSHA regulations
...because OSHA divides responsibilities between the Secretary of Labor,
who promulgates the regulations, and [OSHRC], which adjudicates their
meaning in specific cases"); Donovan v. A. Amorello & Sons, 761 F.2d 61, 63
(1st Cir. 1985) (asking: "Whose opinion about the rule's meaning is entitled to
greater weight? OSHA's? OSHRC's? Or should the court make up its mind
independently about the rule's meaning?").
91. See Brock v. Williams Enters., 832 F.2d 567, 570 (11th Cir. 1987) (according "significant deference" to Secretary's interpretation and noting that
deference is due only to OSHRC's "findings of fact and not to its interpretation"); United Steelworkers v. Schuylkill Metals Corp., 828 F.2d 314, 319 & n.3
(5th Cir. 1987) (deferring to "reasonable interpretation of the Secretary," and
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OSHRC, 92 and several apparently indulge in independent review, deferring to neither interpretation.9 3 One circuit has
94
avoided deciding the issue.
identifying circuit split); Brock v. Chicago Zoological Soc'y, 820 F.2d 909, 912
(7th Cir. 1987) (deferring to Secretary and according OSHRC "no special deference"); Brock v. Schwarz-Jordan, Inc., 777 F.2d 195, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1985)
(per curiam) (finding Secretary's reasonable interpretation is "entitled to great
weight"); A. Amorello & Sons, 761 F.2d at 66 (finding that OSHA "speaks with
greater authority [than OSHRC] when the interpretation of OSHA's substantive rules is at issue"); Marshall v. Southwestern Indus. Contractors & Riggers,
Inc., 576 F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir. 1978) (deferring to Secretary's reasonable interpretation); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n (Kessler & Sons Constr.), 513 F.2d 553, 554 (10th Cir. 1975) (same); Brennan v.
Verne-Woodrow Co., 494 F.2d 1181, 1182 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (same);
Brennan v. Southern Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1974)
(same).
92. See McLaughlin v. Asarco, Inc., 841 F.2d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1988)
(stating in dicta that "[t]his court defers to [OSHRC's] interpretation when it is
'at odds' with the Secretary's"); Brock v. Bechtel Power Corp., 803 F.2d 999,
1000 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that Secretary's interpretation of regulation "carries much less weight when at odds with the Commission's"); Donovan v. Castle & Cooke Foods, 692 F.2d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1982) (deferring to OSHRC,
rather than Secretary, based on OSHRC's "expertise in exercising the independent adjudicatory function"); Donovan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F.2d
315, 325 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating in dicta that "[w]hen the Secretary and
[OSHRC] differ with respect to the interpretation of a standard promulgated
by the Secretary, the interpretation by [OSHRC], and not that of the Secretary, is usually entitled to deference"); Usery v. Hermitage Concrete Pipe Co.,
584 F.2d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 1978) (stating in dicta that when "the Secretary of
Labor and [OSHRC] differ over the construction of the Act... [OSHRC's] ruling is entitled to great deference"); Marshall v. Western Electric, Inc., 565 F.2d
240, 244 (2d Cir. 1977) (deferring to OSHRC's reasonable interpretation);
Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l, 540 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (6th Cir. 1976) (according
"great deference" to OSHRC's interpretation when it conflicts with Secretary's); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n (Fiegen,
Inc.), 513 F.2d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir. 1975) (deferring to OSHRC's reasonable interpretation); Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (4th Cir.
1974) (reasoning that because "Congress has chosen [OSHRC] as the enforcing
agency, the choice between [alternative interpretations] is appropriately committed to it"); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n
(Gerosa), 491 F.2d 1340, 1344 (2d Cir. 1974) (deferring to OSHRC's reasonable
interpretation). But cf. Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n
(Underhill Constr. Co.), 513 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting OSHRC
interpretation as "unreasonable").
93. See, e.g., Marshall v. Anaconda Co., 596 F.2d 370, 374 (9th Cir. 1979)
(rejecting Secretary's interpretation based on "plain wording of the [regulatory] standard"); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1978) (relying on "plain wording" of
regulations, reasoning that split between OSHA and OSHRC interpretations
demonstrates that "no authoritative agency interpretation" exists).
94. See, eg., Brock v. L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1383 n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that court need not decide which interpretation warrants deference "because OSHRC's interpretation [in this case] would be re-
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A Ninth Circuit case, McLaughlin v. Asarco, Inc.,9 5 illustrates the dilemma a court faces'when the Secretary and
OSHRC offer conflicting interpretations of an OSHA regulation. The Secretary promulgated a "medical removal protection
benefits" regulation 96 requiring employers to maintain the
"earnings" of employees removed from employment due to lead
97
exposure as though the employees had not been removed.
The Secretary argued that such employees were entitled to the
overtime pay they would have received in the regular course of
their jobs.98 OSHRC urged that "earnings" meant a worker's
regular hourly wage, exclusive of projected overtime. 99
Although Ninth Circuit precedent suggested that OSHRC's in10 0
the court held that "earnings"
terpretation should control,
1°
included projected overtime,
reasoning that the "plain language" and "plain meaning" of the regulation required this rejected even if it were accorded the full measure of deference due an agency
which had drafted the regulation").
The D.C. Circuit, however, has resolved the analagous question of
whether to defer to the Secretary of Labor or to the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission when they present conflicting interpretations of
regulations under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act. In these cases, the
D.C. Circuit defers to the Secretary's interpretation. See, e.g., Brock v.
Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134, 1146 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (deferring to Secretary); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (stating that "we see no reason to depart from the view we announced
... in CarolinaStalite, which leaves interpretive discretion where it normally
resides, with the policy-maker [the Secretary] rather than the adjudicator")
(citing Donovan v. Carolina Stalite Co., 734 F.2d 1547, 1552 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
The D.C. Circuit, however, once faced a conflict between the Secretary
and an administrative law judge on interpretation of an OSHA rule, and followed the administrative law judge. See Donovan v. A.A. Beiro Constr. Co.,
746 F.2d 894, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reasoning that "we cannot say the ALJ's interpretation of the regulation is unreasonable").
95. 841 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1988).
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k)(2)(ii) (1988).
97. 841 F.2d at 1007.
98. Id at 1007.
99. Id. at 1008-09.
100. See id at 1010 (citing Brock v. Bechtel Power, 803 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding court should defer to OSHRC where Secretary's and
OSHRC's interpretations conflict)).
101. Id. at 1007, 1008-09. The Ninth Circuit's McLaughlin decision accorded
with the result in a prior Fifth Circuit ruling interpreting the same regulation.
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Schuylkill Metals Corp., 828 F.2d 314, 32023 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that "earnings" includes overtime). The Fifth Circuit, however, explicitly followed the Secretary's interpretation rather than
OSHRC's, because that circuit defers to the Secretary rather than to OSHRC
as long as the Secretary's interpretation is "reasonable." Id. at 319. The McLaughlin court acknowledged the conflict between Fifth and Ninth circuit deference standards, but concluded that this "disagreement ... as to the degree of
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sult.'0 2 The court thereby avoided granting express deference
either to the Secretary or OSHRC.
Invoking the "plain meaning" principle 10 3 allowed the McLaughlin court to skirt the issue of a conflict in interpretive authority. Such a court independently chooses a meaning for a
regulation, and perhaps will voice deference to whatever
agency organ advocates that meaning the court chose.
Courts also may use a "reasonableness" test to broaden
their own interpretive discretion. 10 4 Such courts often uphold
deference to be paid to the Secretary's views does not require a further circuit
division on the merits of this dispute." McLaughlin, 841 F.2d at 1010.
102. 841 F.2d at 1007, 1010.
103. This canon of statutory construction requires that courts adhere to the
express terms of an unambiguous statute or regulation. See Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (stating that when "the terms of a statute [are]
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete"); see also Murphy, Old Maxims
Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule" and Statutory Interpretation in the
"Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1300-17 (1975) (discussing
effect and significance of plain-meaning rule's exclusion of legislative history
in interpreting statutes). But cf Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) ("the
plain-meaning rule is 'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and
does not preclude consideration of [other] persuasive evidence if it exists' ")
(quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)
(Holmes, J.)). Courts differ over how plain the meaning of a regulation must
be before the principle applies. See Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous
Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509, 511-20 (1940) (detailing methodological
problems of characterizing plain meaning of statute).
Applying the principle becomes less plausible when more than one interpretation of a given provision is possible. See Rickard v. Auto Publisher, Inc.,
735 F.2d 450, 455 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that "[ain obvious prerequisite to application of the 'plain meaning' rule... is that the statutory language be unambiguous"); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F.
Supp. 1474, 1476 (D.N.J. 1985) (noting that when "statute is somewhat equivocal ....
the 'plain meaning' rule cannot be of much relevance"). The amorphous quality of the plain meaning principle guarantees wide discretion and
flexibility to courts invoking it.
Courts will disregard the principle altogether when applying it would produce an absurd or unreasonable result. See Barbee v. United States, 392 F.2d
532, 535 n.4 (5th Cir.) (stating that "courts have been willing to look behind
otherwise clear language when a literal reading of a statute was inconsistent
with its congressional purpose"), cert denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); see also
Watt, 451 U.S. at 266 n.9 (stating that "one of the surest indexes of a mature
and developed jurisprudence is not to make a fortress out of the dictionary")
(quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.), aff'd,
326 U.S. 404 (1945)); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. J-T Transp. Co., 368 U.S.
81, 107 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that "the 'plain meaning'
rule as an automatic canon of statutory construction is mischievous and misleading and has been long ago rejected").
104. See, e.g., Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n (Gerosa),
491 F.2d 1340, 1345 (2d Cir. 1974). In the Gerosa case, the Secretary had issued
a safety regulation governing business use of cranes and derricks. Id. at 1341-
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an agency interpretation only if they cannot produce a better or
05
more reasonable one.
Other courts conclude that a disagreement between the
Secretary and OSHRC indicates that no "authoritative agency
interpretation" exists. 0 6 Lacking an authoritative agency interpretation, these courts generally provide their own
07
interpretations.1
Resolving the division among the circuits requires closer
examination of the policies underlying Supreme Court decisions on judicial review, 0 8 the legislative history of OSHA, 0 9
42. The regulation required that an employer "designate" an employee to ensure that such machinery was in safe condition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.550(a)(5)
(1988). The Secretary interpreted designate to require an explicit designation,
941 F.2d at 1344; OSHRC held that under industry practice, assigning a competent oiler and operator to a crane was a tacit, "albeit not specifically stated,"
designation within the meaning of the rule. Id. at 1343. The Second Circuit
held that OSHRC's interpretation was unreasonable because it did not guarantee the congressional purpose of "accident prevention" embodied in OSHA. Id.
at 1344. Deriving authority from the vague congressional purpose, the court
trumped the agency interpretation and made its own determination of effective regulation.
105. See, e.g., Marshall v. Western Elec., Inc., 565 F.2d 240, 241-45 (2d Cir.
1977). The Second Circuit will uphold an OSHRC interpretation unless it is
"unreasonable and inconsistent with [the OSHA regulation's] purpose." Id. at
244. In Western Electric, the Secretary had promulgated a rule requiring employers to monitor for carcinogenic vinyl chloride in the air at work sites. Id,
at 242. -The Secretary interpreted the regulation to require certain technical
inspections and cited Western Electric for failing to use these specific measures. Id. at 243. OSHRC interpreted the word monitor in the regulation to
give more discretion to Western Electric, holding that the company could "reliably predict from the physical circumstances that the concentration of vinyl
chloride in the air... would be well below the danger level set by the Secretary." Id. at 244. On appeal, the Second Circuit found OSHRC's interpretation
unreasonable by weighing it against the Secretary's interpretation in light of
the general purposes of OSHA. Id. at 244-45. OSHA, the court stated, was
designed to assure "every working man and woman . . . safe and healthful
working conditions." Id. at 245. Wading through technical information, the
court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation was "better calculated than
the Commission's to achieve... accident prevention and protection against potential danger." Id. at 245.
106. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding no authoritative agency
interpretation existed because OSHRC's decision conflicted with Secretary's
interpretation).
107. See id. (relying on plain meaning of regulation to conclude OSHRC
erred in finding violation); see also Marshall v. Anaconda Co., 596 F.2d 370, 374
(9th Cir. 1979) (independently analyzing regulation based on its language because OSHRC's and Secretary's interpretations differed).
108. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
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REFORMULATING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN
OSHA CASES

Existing precedent requires that courts defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of their own regulations and enabling
statutes.":' OSHA presents a twist, however, because two organs of the same agency sometimes offer conflicting interpretations. The circuits differ over the appropriate standard of
review in such cases." 2 The resulting inconsistency makes results unpredictable 113 and perpetuates unwarranted judicial
policymaking. 1 4 This Note argues that a court should defer to
the Secretary's reasonable interpretations, even though other
interpretations may seem to the court better or more reasonable. 115 This standard of review minimizes judicial policymaking, respects the Secretary's authority and expertise, and
fosters more consistent, predictable law.
A.

THE

NEED FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

The judiciary makes policy when it interprets administrative regulations. 116 Judges are equipped poorly, however, for
making policy decisions in technical areas. 1 7 The Supreme
110. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (identifying unpredictability resulting from inconsistent judicial standards of review).
114. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text (discussing judicial policymaking resulting from courts' interpretation of regulations).
115. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
116. Cf.5 K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:15, at 394 (2d ed.
1984) (observing "The political limit [on judicial assumption of policymaking
power] is generally weak and .... [c]ourts refrain from substituting their own
policies only to the extent that they believe they should do so."); 2 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:13, at 60 (1979) (stating "[O]ne of the most
important factors in each decision on what weight to give an interpretative
rule is the degree of judicial agreement or disagreement with the rule ....");
Pierce, supra note 4, at 485 (stating "The statutory interpretation adopted by a
judge... almost invariably coincides with the judge's political philosophy.").
117. See F. HEFFRON & N. MCFEELEY, supra note 1, at 314 (noting that
when courts "become too deeply enmeshed in 'Monday morning quarterbacking' of administrative decisions they do not make better technical decisions
than the agencies"); Starr, supra note 75, at 309 (noting "[a]n agency obviously
enjoys a more thorough understanding [than a court] of how... different interpretations of a particular provision affect relevant parties").
Because most agency decisions never reach a court, however, the judiciary
never will receive the opportunity to broadly manage policymaking. See D.
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Court recently recognized this judicial deficiency by limiting
the scope of judicial oversight of agencies, 118 reflecting its abandonment of the notion that courts should vigorously review and
willingly reverse agency actions. This new philosophy of deference mandates that courts respect agency authority and avoid
substituting judicial policy decisions for those of agencies.1 1 9
In OSHA cases involving conflicting interpretations by the
Secretary and OSHRC, however, some lower courts have
avoided deferring to the agency by relying on the vague plain
meaning rule,1 20 a reasonableness test,1 2 ' or the division of authority between the Secretary and OSHRC.1 22 Sometimes
courts delve into technical, value-laden analysis that is better
left to agency authority and expertise.12 3 Such activism contradicts Supreme Court precedent requiring deference to the
agency. 124 Moreover, sound political analysis suggests that
agencies, although imperfect, are more legitimate and politically responsive policymakers than courts.
Advocates of aggressive judicial review decry the bureaucratic monster,125 arguing that agencies are unduly insulated
from public control. 126 Some scholars insist that this insularity
RILEY, supra note 11, at 136 (noting most bureaucratic decisions are never reviewed by courts).
118. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron
case).
119. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (surveying impact of Chevron in lower federal courts).
120. See supra notes 95-102 (discussing McLaughlin v. Asarco, 841 F.2d
1006, 1007, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1988), in which court strained concept of plain
meaning to conclude that word earnings in a regulation included projected
overtime pay).
121. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Marshall v. Western Elec., Inc., 565 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977);
supra note 105.
124. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text (reviewing deference
cases).
125. See J. DeLong, supra note 1 at 429. According to Delong:
The steady growth of the Regulatory State has greatly increased the
number of grants of authority that agencies may exploit. Also, the
very fact that there has been an explosion of regulatory authorities
means that any specific statute, and any specific exercise of authority,
is less visible than it would have been two or three decades ago.
Id,
126. Commentators emphasize the danger unguarded agency power poses
to a government supposed to be responsive to the electorate. See F. HEFFRON
& N. MCFEELEY, supra note 1, at 143 (arguing "regulatory agencies are [frequently] allowed to operate for long periods of time without either Congress
or the President paying any substantial attention to them or making any attempt to oversee or intervene in their activities"); see also D. RILEY, supra
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note 11, at 173 (stating "two rather important political values--concern for a
general public interest and competence--can easily be casualties of this highly
professionalized, agency-centered policymaking process"). Critics charge that
because of agencies' insularity, agencies need not be competent and efficient.
See, eg., C. BEZOLD, R. CARLSON, & J. PECK, THE FUTURE OF WORK AND
HEALTH 143 (1986) (arguing that special interests have caused agencies to pursue inefficient "cure" policies rather than efficient "prevention" policies);
Calavita, The Demise of the OccupationalSafety and Health Administration:
A Case Study in Symbolic Action, 30 Soc. PROBS. 437, 437 (1983) (noting that
labor and management have criticized OSHA for "inefficiency and lack of
meaningful impact").
DeLong identifies six reasons to limit and control agency action. DeLong,
supra note 1, at 406-10. First, concern for the twin values of procedural fairness and equal protection requires control of agency action. Second, society
benefits from agencies only as long as they perform their delegated tasks competently. Third, agencies should refrain from exercising more power than
Congress granted them and should resist stepping beyond their institutional
role. Fourth, agency procedures should be scrutinized to determine the extent
to which agencies tolerate their own errors. Fifth, the voluminous number of
agency functions must be coordinated to ensure the government works as
smoothly and expediently as possible. Finally, because societal resources are
scarce, agencies should not consume resources unless they are producing a
concomitant benefit. Id
Although society holds agencies to a higher standard than their private
sector business counterparts, agencies have performed reasonably well. See
Milward & Rainey, supra note 2, at 151-52 (noting "economic markets can fail,
and fail badly, to provide all of the goods, services, and outcomes which we
want and need," but "heavy emphasis on operating efficiency may distort the
role, purpose, and value of government in our society").
Nonetheless, the costs of agency actions often are more glaring and publicized than their benefits. See Vaupel, On the Benefits of Health and Safety
Regulation, in THE BENEFITS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 1, 12 (A.
Ferguson & E. Leveen ed. 1981). Moreover, society requires tremendous openness from agencies and subjects them to a number of procedural obstacles that
private sector actors need not face. Milward and Rainey note that:
GM does not have to hold 'citizen participation' hearings before every
major decision they make. Having to manage in a fishbowl and to
have your files constantly open for public inspection-as the Freedom
of Information Act allows-may be wonderful if judged from the criterion of accountability but it makes it very difficult to be efficient.
Milward & Rainey, supra note 2, at 156. Milward and Rainey conclude that
"the public bureaucracy in the United States is more valuable, and is performing more effectively, than many people assume." Id. at 163.
Furthermore, the public can influence agency government. See D. RILEY,
supra note 11, at 123-30 (discussing methods by which public can influence
agencies). Federal policy on workplace health and safety provides an example
of public influence over regulatory policy. See C. NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT
WORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA 69-97 (1986) (tracing political origins of
OSHA to popular desire in 1960s for workplace safety, which led to support
from other political entities such as labor unions and executive branch); Szasz,
The Reversal of FederalPolicy Toward Worker Safety and Health, 50 SCI. &
Soc'Y 25, 34-35 (1986) (noting that "political mass movement" led to deregulation and gutting of OSHA in 1980s); Szasz, Industrial Resistance to Occupational Safety and Health Legislation: 1971-1981, 32 Soc. PROBS. 103, 104-06
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fosters policies contrary to the public interest. 127 These theo(1984) (describing how public pressure led to passage of OSHA despite opposition of industrial interests).
Finally, bureaucrats are not homogeneous, but represent the populace,
with a wide variety of personal backgrounds. See Stone, Whither the Welfare
State? Professionalization,Bureaucracy,and the Market Alternative, 93 ETHicS 588, 591 (1983) (noting that "upper-level administrators and street-level
employees have divergent outlooks and interests"). Professional bureaucrats
are guided by professional norms and standards that provide an "inner check
on their behavior" and allow them to respond "neutrally and competently to
competing interests." Stone, supra, at 575 (concluding that "the profession
provides the professional administrator with a Rosetta Stone for deciphering
and responding to various elements of the public interest"). Arguably, therefore, professional standards control bureaucrats at least as well as they control
judges.
127. Political commentators long have criticized the "iron triangles" among
congressional committees, regulatory agencies, and the private actors they regulate. See, eg., Miller, Pretense and Our Two Constitutions,54 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 375, 382 (1986) (arguing that iron triangles "provide the means by which
much public policy is made"); Schoenbrod, supra note 58, at 1245 (asserting
that "[tihe iron triangle represents the most powerful forces at work in the
administrative process"). Iron triangle theory suggests that these policy troikas operate outside of public recognition and accountability, and therefore
generate self-serving regulations; in return for regulated parties' political support, congressional committee members increase the budgets and authority of
the agencies, who in turn suit regulations to the demands of the regulated parties. See, e.g., Miller, The Administration's Role in Deregulation, 55 ANTITRUST L. J. 199, 200 (1986) (describing "the traditional paradigm of the iron
triangle").
A similar argument contends that agencies become "captured" by the interests they regulate. Representatives of the agency and of the regulated industry together formulate policy "in a closed environment with a limited
number of participants who share common views, information, and interests.
The agency's bonds with the regulated industry are constantly strengthened as
personnel are interchanged, and a relationship of interdependency is fostered
between the agency and the regulatee." F. HEFFRON & N. McFEELEY, supra
note 1, at 155-56.
The iron triangle model fails, however, to provide an accurate analysis of
United States government today. Increased openness in government and the
rise of numerous public advocacy groups shed sufficient light on the regulatory
process to discourage self-serving deals among members of Congress, agencies,
and regulated parties. According to one study:
Several fundamental social and economic trends have led to the
rise of... citizen groups. The growth of a vast, educated middle class
in the years since the Second World War has greatly expanded their
potential membership, and that has also created a large new audience
for ideological appeals. A revolution in communications technology
has provided the means by which this new element of the population
can be reached. New patrons of political action provided needed organizational stability, and many controversial regulatory and redistributive issues crowded onto the political agenda.
Gais, Peterson & Walker, Interest Groups, Iron Tiangles and Representative
Institutions in American National Government, 14 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 161, 183
(1984). These changes have expanded the number of actors able to influence
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rists ignore the volatility of bureaucracy as a political issue, 128
as well as legislators' superior bargaining power 129 and the
clout elected officials hold over agencies.1 30
Congress can exert control over the federal bureaucracy by
creating, modifying, or revoking agency authority.' 3 ' Moreover,
the legislative process, and have opened this process to closer public oversight,
as citizen groups monitor agency actors and distribute information. Id at 16366, 177-80. Consequently, a greater "number and variety of interests... have
achieved formal representation in the American system." I& at 163. Such
openness, and the active observation of Congress by public groups, undermines
the secrecy needed for closet dealmaking. Id. at 178-79. As a result, the House
and Senate make more decisions on the floor of the legislature, which "does
not allow for coherence, attention to detail, or control by substantive experts."
Id. at 180. Congress still sets broad policy guidelines through legislation, but
leaves control over the details of policy implementation to the executive
branch. Id; see also infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text (assessing
methods of executive control of agencies). Finally, iron triangle theory assumes cooperation between the agency and the client; often, however, the two
are at odds. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 126, at 592 (stating that "[t]he
agency/client nexus is less one of reciprocity than of mutual antagonism").
128. See, e.g., Milward & Rainey, supra note 2, at 149 (characterizing bureaucracy as "major theme" in recent elections). A desire for reelection presumably motivates legislators, and votes for expanding agency bureaucracy can
brand a candidate a supporter of big government. Moreover, when an agency
decision ultimately disadvantages a particular party, that party will know
which legislators supported the agency. Deferring policymaking to an agency
therefore does not sweep an issue under the political carpet. Further, members of Congress have long-term political incentives to oversee agency
policymaking:
Congress as a whole may be happy to delegate these ... questions to
bureaucrats, but specific members of Congress want to keep an eye
on, sometimes even a hand in, the action. The reasons are two. Such
questions can have a significant impact on a member's re-election
chances, and they are critical to the success of a particular policy.
D. RILEY, supra note 11, at 65.
129. Cf.Eavey & Miller, BureaucraticAgenda Controk Imposition or Bargaining?,78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 719, 719, 724-31 (1984) (concluding on basis of
experiment that agencies do have impact on legislation, but that agencies are
only small number of variety of actors able to lobby legislators, and therefore
do not impose policy agendas on legislature); see also D. RILEY, supra note 11,
at 59 (arguing that "pattern of cooperation" between Congress and agencies affords Congress influence over agency policy).
130. See infra notes 131-33 (assessing methods by which Congress can control agencies).
131. See D. RILEy, supra note 11, at 81 (stating that through enabling legislation, Congress controls scope of agency power); cf.Milward & Rainey, supra
note 2, at 160 (noting that Congress must clarify legislative goals so bureaucracies can "translate legislative intent into an implementable program"). Moreover, by systematically overseeing agency activity, Congress effectively can
monitor agencies' power and efficiency. See D. RILEY, supra note 11, at 69-80
(explaining three forms of oversight). In this manner, Congress can act as a
manager of agency activities, holding agencies accountable for their actions
and ensuring that agencies follow the policy goals set through the legislative
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members of Congress can publicize an issue and thereby draw
132
public attention to it as a counterweight to agency insularity.
By manipulating the budget process, Congress also can demand
policies, and can increase or
that agencies implement particular
133
constrain bureaucratic activity.
The president also can control agency action. 3 4 Like the
legislature, the executive can influence the political agenda, 35
thereby shaping legislation affecting agencies and funneling
public attention toward particular regulatory policies. In addition, the executive can6control agencies effectively through the
3
appointment process.
process. See Ink, The Presidentas Manager,in
(R. DiClerico ed. 1985):

ANALYZING THE PRESIDENCY 36

For a few examples of how deeply Congress has become involved in
management, consider the ability of appropriations subcommittees to
determine how a department head organizes his or her immediate office, the ability of these same subcommittees to decide that an effort
to improve auditing is unwarranted, or congressional blocking of decentralization of a function within an agency.
Id.
132. See Gais, Peterson & Walker, supra note 127, at 165 (discussing how
direct congressional involvement in debate attracts public attention).
133. See D. RILEY, supra note 11, at 90-92 (discussing congressional use of
budget to control agency activity); Bendor & Moe, An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 755, 772 (1985) (same); Calavita,
supra note 126, at 440-41, 443 (giving examples of how congressional budget
policy controlled agencies during 1980s). In recent years, Congress has implemented budgetary reforms to afford even greater control of agency activity.
See Staats, Improving Congressional Oversight of Administration Through
Evaluation and Analysis, in PROBLEMS IN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 13, 13-15
(R. Miewald and M. Steinman eds. 1984) (enumerating budgetary reforms).
Staats suggests that these budget reforms open the door for Congress to use
better evaluation techniques, considering agency effectiveness at meeting specific goals with specific resources, and thereby exerting even more control over
bureaucracy. Id. at 13, 15-21.
134. The president's ability to control agencies depends on a variety of factors. See Mars, The Constitution, the Presiden and Administrative Reform,
in D. CALIsTA, BUREAUCRATIC AND GOVERNMENTAL REFORM 91 (1986). (suggesting that president's powers of administrative reform depend on personality
and leadership style, relations with Congress and its leaders, relations with bureaucracy, relations with his or her party and its leaders, prestige and public
reputation, importance he or she assigns to reform, mastery of administrative
style, tenacity, and willingness to bargain and compromise); cf. D. RILEY,
supra note 11, at 18-19 (observing that executive often lacks interest and information necessary to manage bureaucracy).
135. See supra note 132; Page, Presidentsas Opinion Leaders: Some New
Evidence, 12 POL'Y STUD. J. 649, 658 (1984) (stating that "[p]residents, at least
popular presidents, can indeed bring about changes in the policy preferences
of the American public"). But cf id. (noting that unpopular presidents ...
have no effect at all or maybe even a negative impact").
136. Each president appoints approximately 2,500 agency personnel, includ-
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Finally, the president can influence agency policy regularly
through management. 13 7 The president can select and guide
agency personnel, evaluate agency performance in the light of
clear presidential policy statements, coordinate the various
agencies and branches of government, 138 propose reorganization
of the bureaucracy, and initiate resource allocation through the
budget process. 139 Although a president attempting to achieve
broad control of agency programs will encounter obstacles,' 40
ing the people to fill critical agency head posts. D. RILEY, supra note 11, at 24.
Although the appointment power has limits, see id. at 34, presidents have used
it effectively to reshape agency policy. See Nathan, Administrative Tactics
Under Reagan, in ANALYZING THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 131, at 146, 150-51,
155 (describing how former President Reagan used careful selection process
and "indoctrination" of appointees "in advancing [the Reagan administration's]
domestic goals"); Bollier, The Emasculation of OSHA, 51 Bus. & Soc'Y REV.,
Fall 1984, at 37, 38 (noting that Reagan's appointment of Thorne Auchter as
OSHA assistant secretary resulted in "one of the sharpest policy reversals in
the federal government"); D. NELKIN & M. BROWN, supra note 1, at 126 (noting that former President Carter's appointment of Eula Bingham as OSHA assistant secretary brought about "substantial administrative changes");
Calavita, supra note 126, at 441-43 (enumerating specific policy changes engineered by Reagan OSHA appointees); DeLong, supra note 1, at 439 (noting
that "the power to fire the agency head, without more, is probably enough to
allow a President to impose his will on the agency"). But cf. Humphrey's Ex'r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935) (noting that Congress can create
agency whose head can be fired only "for cause"); see also Pierce, supra note 4,
at 510-12 (arguing Humphrey's Exr should be construed narrowly).
137. Cf. Ink, supra note 131, at 135 (suggesting constitutional basis for executive as governmental manager). Moreover, other tools also exist. See, e.g.,
D. RILEY, supra note 11, at 35 (discussing executive use of legislative clearance
process to force agencies to bargain on policy).
138. See Ink, supra note 131, at 137-45 (suggesting management techniques); see also Ingraham, Building Bridges or Burning Them? The President the Appointees, and the Bureaucracy, 47 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 426, 425
(1987) (describing impact of recent increased efforts at presidential control).
139. See D. RILEY, supra note 11, at 40 (discussing reorganization); Hammond & Miller, A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority in Bureaucracy, 29 AM. J. POL. SC. 1, 6 (1985) (noting some scholars suggest
"executive leadership" in form of budgetary control and administrative reorganization, to give central direction to bureaucratic action); see also N. HEFFRON & N. MCFEELEY, supra note 1, at 124 (noting that although "Congress
has the final word on the amount and allocation of monetary resources" to
agencies, president has "the first word, . . . [which] has proven to be a potent
tool in controlling agencies"). But see D. RILEY, supra note 11, at 50 (discussing limits on executive use of budget process).
140. Ingraham argues that past executive attempts to manage the bureaucracy have failed because presidents have appointed political officials to agency
posts who lack expertise and respect for agency personnel. Such officials are
unprepared for service and serve only a short time. Ingraham, supranote 138,
at 426-30. The executive branch, however, is flexible enough to counteract
those problems. The Senior Executive Service (SES), created in 1979, provides
for increased evaluation of career bureaucracy executives by political agents of
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the executive is best suited politically and constitutionally to
manage the federal bureaucracy. 141 The executive certainly is
more politically accountable than the judiciary.142
This analysis corroborates the wisdom of Supreme Court
precedent requiring judicial deference to agencies. 143 In the
context of OSHA, courts therefore lack interpretive authority
and should defer to the reasonable interpretation of either the
Secretary or OSHRC. They must not engage in independent
review. Deciding which of the two administrative bodies deserves deference is a more difficult problem requiring further
examination of legislative history, precedent, and policy.

B. THE SECRETARY'S INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY
The legislative history of OSHA demonstrates that Congress had many opportunities to confront the issue of policymaking authority. 1 4 Legislators rejected the idea of taking
the executive. Id. at 426, 430. Although it has proven somewhat difficult to
implement, the SES offers "increased potential for political control" of the
agencies. Id. at 430. Ingraham further suggests that presidents educate appointees on policy and bureaucratic practices, and ask them to sign a contract
committing them to two years at their posts and to pursuit of their agencies'
policy purposes. Id at 433.
141. See Ink, supra note 131, at 136 (arguing that "no true accountability
[exists] in these areas short of the President"). DeLong, supra note 1, at 425,
notes "the Executive Office has a better chance of achieving the broad interagency policy coordination that courts cannot." Id. Such coordination is necessary to make the agency structure function effectively. Id. at 431.
142. See Public Citizen v. Burke, 843 F.2d 1473, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (requiring deference to agency on grounds that "the Executive Branch, populated
by political appointees, is thought to have greater legitimacy than the nonpolitical Judiciary in resolving statutory ambiguities, in light of policy concerns, when congressional intent is unclear") (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1989)); Pierce, supra
note 4, at 506 (arguing that comparative institutional analysis favors executive
branch over judiciary for making policy choices because judiciary is "least politically accountable branch").
Courts effectively can police agency bias, however. The potential for bias
arises because agencies often are able to make rules, enforce them, and adjudicate disputes, while sometimes becoming interested parties in the adjudication.
See F. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 11 (noting that "[i]n a major proportion of
administrative law cases, the agency is itself one of the parties to the dispute
which it is empowered to resolve"). Courts provide a primary check on agency
bias by ensuring that agencies strictly follow the procedures of the APA. For
example, courts must prevent unofficial agency communications with interested parties which leave "the door to biased decision making wide open." D.
RILEY, supra note 11, at 146.
143. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text (tracing OSHA's legislative history).
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that authority away from the Secretary of Labor on several occasions. 145 Moreover, Congress created OSHRC mainly as a
factfinding body, to relieve the Secretary of Labor of responsibility for conducting hearings and to assure the public a fair
proceeding. Senate floor debate clarified the Senate's understanding that OSHRC would serve merely a factfinding role,
and not become an adjudicative lawmaker.146 The legislative
history thus suggests, as some courts have recognized, 147 that in
a conflict of interpretation between the Secretary and OSHRC,
a court should defer to the Secretary-the policymaking bodyrather than to OSHRC-the factfinder.
Courts favoring the Secretary's interpretations over those
of OSHRC argue that Congress vested greater policymaking authority in the Secretary, pointing to the legislative history 148
and express wording 149 of OSHA. Courts favoring OSHRC interpretations suggest that Congress intended OSHRC to have
interpretive authority, 50 pointing to the credentials and exper145. See supra notes 35, 46-50, 52, 54 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Donovan v. A. Amorello & Sons, 761 F.2d 61, 65 (1st Cir.
1985) (reasoning that Congress intended Secretary to have rulemaking power);
Dale M. Madden Constr. v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278, 280-81 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that OSHA "imposes policy-making responsibility upon the Secretary ....
[and] limits [OSHRC] to adjudication").
148. See A. Amorello & Sons, 761 F.2d at 65 (noting that legislative "history
suggests ... OSHRC's mission is primarily factual in nature"). The court also
noted that "Congress specifically rejected a plan to place rulemaking powers
in a body independent of OSHA." Id
149. See Brock v. Williams Enter., 832 F.2d 567, 569-70 (11th Cir. 1982);
Brock v. Chicago Zoological Soc'y, 820 F.2d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 1987); Brennan v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n (Kessler & Sons Constr.), 513
F.2d 553, 554 (10th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Southern Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d
498, 501 (5th Cir. 1974).
150. The Fourth Circuit considered this issue in Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974). The court reasoned that Congress intended to allow OSHRC to adopt rules and policies in adjudication because
"Congress deliberately created [OSHRC] separate and independent of the Secretary." Id. at 1262. The court argued further that OSHRC must receive deference or it "would be little more than a specialized jury ... charged only with
fact finding." Id. The court concluded that Congress intended OSHRC to
"have the normal complement of adjudicatory powers possessed by traditional
administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission." Id. See also
Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l, 540 F.2d 1283, 1289 (6th Cir. 1976) (concluding that
OSHA "empowers [OSHRC] to perform 'the final administrative adjudication
of the Act' ") (quoting Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n (Fiegen, Inc.), 513 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 1985)); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n (Republic Creosoting Co.), 501 F.2d
1196, 1199 (4th Cir. 1974) (concluding OSHRC's "interpretations regarding the
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tise of OSHRC commissioners. 15 1 The Secretary, however, ar152
guably possesses more interpretive expertise than OSHRC.
153
Moreover, expertise is no substitute for authority.
In other contexts, courts have held that agencies with policymaking authority deserve more interpretive deference than
adjudicatory bodies. In Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director,5 4 the Supreme Court accorded no deference to the BRB's
statutory interpretations, because the BRB is merely an adjudicatory board while the Secretary of Labor possesses statutory
authority to make policy. 155 Application of the same reasoning
to a conflict of interpretations between the Secretary and
OSHRC suggests that courts should defer to the Secretary's
interpretations.
C.

PRACTICAL POLICY

Rule interpretation involves value decisions and policymaking.' 56 The Secretary is a better policymaker than
OSHRC, partly because "formal adjudication is atrocious procemeaning of the Act should be given substantial deference by a court" because
statute states that OSHRC's findings of fact shall be conclusive).
Congress's purpose in allowing final orders to issue from OSHRC, however, was to facilitate administrative expediency rather than to grant policymaking authority. See LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 194 (separate
views of Sen. Javits); see also id. at 392 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (noting that
finality of OSHRC orders would greatly increase "speed of enforcement," saving between six months and two years).
151. See Brock v. Bechtel Power, 803 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1986); (noting
OSHRC commissioners are appointed by virtue of specialized training, education, or expertise); Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d at 1262 (same); Dunlop, 504
F.2d at 1289 (same). Courts also suggest that adjudication breeds expertise.
See, e.g., Bechtel Power, 803 F.2d at 1000 (deferring to OSHRC because of its
"expertise in exercising the independent adjudicatory function"); Donovan v.
Castle & Cooke Foods, 692 F.2d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1982) (same).
152. See A. Amorello & Sons, 761 F.2d at 66 (noting that because Secretary
chose regulatory language, Secretary is "more likely to have an institutional
memory of the regulation's purposes and meaning"). The A. Amorello & Sons
court reasoned that the Secretary would have comparatively more expertise
than OSHRC, stating that: "OSHA's experience as both a 'legislating' and 'enforcing' agency provides it with expert knowledge of the likely practical outcomes of different interpretations [while OSHRC's] expertise . . . is likely
factual in nature; and it necessarily concerns examples of rule violations
(which are presumably less typical than instances of compliance)." Id.
153. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (arguing that OSHA
statute grants Secretary greater interpretive authority than OSHRC).
154. 449 U.S. 268 (1980).
155. Id. at 278 n.18.
156. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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dure for policymaking affecting the multitude. 1 5 7
OSHA regulations apply nationwide and potentially encompass many employers.1 58 OSHRC, however, bases its decisions on the facts of the case before it. The Secretary considers
the broader application of rules 59 and provides potentially af160
fected parties more notice and opportunity to participate.
The Secretary's regulations and interpretations, therefore, are
likely based on more evidence and a broader perspective than
16 1
those of OSHRC.
Moreover, if OSHRC or a court interprets a regulation in a
way contrary to the Secretary's interpretation, the new rule can
apply retroactively to parties who relied on the Secretary's interpretation.362 Violating such reliance seems particularly unfair because an OSHRC decision will not change the express
163
wording of a regulation.
Potential conflict of rule interpretations prevents regulated
parties from predicting what they must do to comply with the
law.164 Predictability is essential, however, to a successful regu157. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 17, § 7:6, at 33.
158. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that OSHA covers
five million workers).
159. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 17, § 7:6, at 33.
160. See id § 7:25, at 119 (arguing that "[a]s a means of making new law,
rulemaking is superior to adjudication ... [because] adjudication procedure
normally provides no... protection to nonparties"); see also D. RILEY, supra
note 11, at 153 (arguing that adjudication procedures do not specify who must
be notified of result, and that any notification is less formal than at policymaking stage).
161. See infra note 164 (characterizing agency interpretive rules as superior to adjudicatory interpretations).
162. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 17, § 7:6, at 34.
163. Changing the interpretation of a law without changing its wording detracts from the institutional integrity of legislators, agencies, and courts overseeing application of the law. A special problem arises when the Secretary
urges a particular interpretation for the first time at a violator's hearing. See
supra note 77. In such a case, the potential for bias would increase if OSHRC
or courts yielded unquestioningly to the Secretary's interpretation. Perhaps
the proper approach is to disregard the rule's application in the particular case
if the wording of the regulation is too vague to provide notice that the Secretary's interpretation was what the regulation likely was intended to mean. See
Donovan v. Burger King Corp., 675 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1982) (suggesting that
Secretary should "reconsider the regulations as issued" rather than applying
them to particular case through interpretation).
164. See F. HEFFRON & N. MCFEELEY, supra note 1, at 229 (noting that
rulemaking through adjudication creates "uncertainty as to expected behavior" because standards may be constantly in flux); Asimow, supra note 20, at
408 (characterizing interpretive rules as "more accessible, more reliable, and,
because of their generalized form, much more useful than interpretation supplied through formal or informal adjudication").
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latory program.1 6 5 Such predictability would result from all
circuits deferring to the Secretary's interpretations.
Furthermore, an employer cited on the basis of the Secretary's interpretation of a rule is more likely to challenge the citation through litigation if OSHRC or the courts can alter the
law by changing the interpretation. Increased litigation saps resources and postpones compliance.1 6 6 Noncompliance is especially troublesome in the area of occupational health and
16 7

safety.

Consequently, courts should treat the Secretary's interpretations as those of the "agency" under OSHA. 168 Courts should
accept the Secretary's interpretation so long as it is reasonable,
169
even if other interpretations seem better or more reasonable.
This formulation respects the Secretary's authority and exper165. Those affected by regulations need to calculate the costs of complying
in order to manage efficiently in the marketplace. See, e.g., Viscusi, Reforming
OSHA Regulation of Workplace Risks, in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT ACTuALLY HAPPENED 234, 237 (1986) (employers need to be aware of compliance
costs and risks to calculate "compensating wage differentials" workers will demand to take particular job). Noble states:
[Ain effective occupational safety and health program must force employers to increase their investments in prevention and involve workers in plant governance. To accomplish these goals, the state must set
standards that provide employers with clear and consistent signals
about the appropriate levels and kinds of investment in protection
.... Capital expenditures can be minimized if employers take health
and safety into account when they purchase new equipment and design new plants. Capital goods producers are likely to comply with
existing standards, and firms are likely to acquire state-of-the-art
equipment routinely as they invest in new capital. In contrast, it is
very costly to retrofit existing plants.
C. NOBLE, supra note 126, at 196-97.
166. See Kelman, Bureaucracy and the Regulation of Health at Work, A
Comparison of the U.S. and Sweden, in CRrrICAL STUDIES IN ORGANIZATION
AND BUREAUCRACY 370-71 (F. FISCHER & C. SIRIANNI, eds. 1984) (arguing that
increased OSHA litigation produces unnecessary transaction costs, sapping
scarce enforcement resources). One commentator has noted:
Based both on recent legislation and the courts' willingness to concern themselves more and more with administrative actions, litigation
against federal agencies has skyrocketed. Apart from the merit of individual cases, litigation often exerts a heavy impact on agency management through extended delays, higher costs, and hesitancy to take
action.
Ink, supra note 131, at 136.
167. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting that worker safety
requires expedient compliance).
168. Courts must accord great deference to "agency" interpretations. See
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); supra
notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
169. Cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing formulations of
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tise, affords predictability in rule interpretation,' 7 0 and circumvents the policy pitfalls of judicial activism and adjudicatory
policymaking.17 1
III.

CONCLUSION

The judiciary makes policy when it actively interprets regulations. Agencies themselves, however, possess greater interpretive expertise and are more responsive to political control
than courts. Courts therefore should give meaningful deference to agency interpretations. Deferring to agency interpretations becomes complicated, however, when various organs of
one agency interpret that agency's regulations differently.
OSHA presents such a situation.
This Note has demonstrated that when the Secretary of
Labor and OSHRC develop conflicting interpretations of OSHA
regulations, courts should defer to the Secretary's interpretation. Legislative history suggests that Congress vested the Secretary with policymaking authority. In analogous situations,
courts have deferred to policymaking bodies rather than adjudicators. This solution allows the policymaker, rather than the
adjudicator, to establish rules with nationwide application.
Moreover, deferring to the policymaker fosters predictability,
which is crucial to efficient regulation of occupational health
and safety.
Tracy N. Tool

Chevron standard); Brennan v. Southern Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d 498, 500
(5th Cir. 1974) (adopting this standard).
170. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (arguing that the more
ambiguous a standard of review is, the more selectively a court can apply it).

This proposed standard still allows courts to strike truly unreasonable agency

interpretation-those that produce manifestly unfair or absurd results. Courts
should not, however, simply compare various possible interpretations and
choose the one that seems best.

